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The nature of identity has changed dramatically in recent years and has grown in complexity. Identities are defined in
multiple domains: biological and psychological elements strongly contribute, but biographical and cyber elements also
are necessary to complete the picture. Law enforcement is beginning to adjust to these changes, recognizing identity’s
importance in criminal justice. The SuperIdentity project seeks to aid law enforcement officials in their identification
tasks through research of techniques for discovering identity traits, generation of statistical models of identity and
analysis of identity traits through visualization. We present use cases compiled through user interviews in multiple
fields, including law enforcement, and describe the modeling and visualization tools design to aid in those use cases.
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The complexity of identities has increased dramatically
in recent years, particularly with the introduction and
widespread adoption of social networks and broader
online activities [1]. The complexity presents challenges
for law enforcement, especially given the massive volumes
of data being generated [2]. Identity is a key enabling
factor in almost everything in the 21st century [3]; suc-
cessfully identifying individuals underpins almost every
secure and private system. Important systems such as
banking, international travel, and commerce all rely on
identity; many interpersonal services rely on individuals
identifying themselves (e.g., email, information technology
services, etc.)[4].
Gathering a more complete picture of an individual
(identity enrichment) and tracing an activity back to the
acting party (identity attribution) are tasks complicated
by the diversity of identifying information. However,
the glut of data can also aid law enforcement in their
investigative tasks if they can take advantage of it [5].
Furthermore, new connections and investigative paths
are accessible if the research can be materialized into
operational procedures [6].* Correspondence: joe.bruce@pnnl.gov
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in any medium, provided the original work is pLaw enforcement decision makers are now recognizing
the importance of using social networks in their investi-
gations. The International Association of Chiefs of Police
(IACP) conducted a survey in 2012 that showed that 92.4%
of the 600 law enforcement agencies polled were using
social media [7]. Law enforcement personnel can use social
media for prevention of crime as well as investigation of
crime. Information about plans for protests often can be
found online as can discussions and photographs of
activities that have occurred [8]. As identity spans both
the natural and the cyber worlds, it is important that
law enforcement have the tools to establish and pursue
identities as they flow across the domain boundaries; no
longer is it sufficient to explore identities purely in one
domain [3].
The SuperIdentity project is designed to accomplish
just that: provide the tools that pursue identities across
domains. SuperIdentity is a collaborative effort among six
UK universities and a US national laboratory conducting
research in a variety of domains that can aid in attribution
and enrichment investigative tasks. This paper presents
a visual analytic application developed at the Pacific
Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) that provides a
visual interface to a complex statistical model of identity,
developed at the University of Oxford. The model encapsu-
lates research performed at the collaborating universities inOpen Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly credited.
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can lead an investigator from that which is known to that
which is unknown but essential to the investigative task.
The pathways generated by the model, and the
visualization that makes them accessible, will enable
law enforcement to take full advantage of the intercon-
nected elements of identity in our modern world. From
the beginning, the SuperIdentity project has used a
user-centric design approach. An early activity in the
SuperIdentity project was the collection of use cases
(Developing the use cases Section) to explore how vari-
ous law enforcement roles could interact with the model.
The aim of this activity was twofold. The initial aim was
to understand how various types of end users undertook
the task of identifying individuals, including the data used,
the initial evidence that was usually available, the desired
outcome of the identification, and the amount of uncer-
tainty that could be tolerated. Secondly, the information
obtained in these use cases helped to guide the deve-
lopment of the model for identity and the visualization to
support those same end users. The use cases were collec-
ted through interviews with law enforcement personnel
and illustrate difference scenarios in identifying individ-
uals or in enriching the identification of an individual.
These use cases helped researchers understand how law
enforcement personnel go about doing identification tasks
and problems and constraints in this work. Exemplar
use cases were developed from current use cases and
illustrate how new types of identity traits could facilitate
identification tasks. The application has been developed
using exemplar use cases that have helped identify useful
visualization techniques. A user-centered evaluation is
also planned for later in the year and will be discussed
in the Future Work section.
Research in identity attribution and enrichment is be-
ginning to explore how this process may span the physical
and cyber world divide. For instance, links between
biometric physical features and avatar recognition for
identity authentication and enrichment are being explored
[9]. There has been a focus on authorship attribution, for
example, to determine if the content of multiple online
social network identities belongs to a single author [10] or
extracting identity features in tracing cybercrime [11].
Several active research consortiums are exploring how
to mine and model identity data in more comprehensive
ways. The Collaborative information, Acquisition, Process-
ing, Exploitation and Reporting project (CAPER) is one
of the larger ongoing projects [12]. This active consortium
is focused on enabling law enforcement agencies across
the EU to work together, with a focus on the ability to
use and share open source intelligence to detect and
prevent organized crime. The development process of
the Caper Regulatory Model (CRM) has taken a user-
centric approach in involving law enforcement users inthe function, legality, and visualization of the model. The
project has been guided by the goals to enable analysts
to collaboratively collect, connect, and work with multiple
data types (e.g., audio, text, video) to enrich identity infor-
mation, while allowing analysts to fuse their own closed
source data with open source on a site-by-site basis.
However, much of the project’s focus has been developing
the former (enhancing open source web mining/analysis
capabilities) to provide “early warning” trends for orga-
nized crime across cyber-space. Although there is some
discussion on the inclusion of physical domain identity
attributes, such as biometric data, there is no indication of
cross-domain links or inference capabilities beyond big
data pattern detection within CRM.
The Uncertainty of Identity multidisciplinary project has
been capitalizing on the wealth of location information
now available in the cyber world [13]. Specifically, this
project looks at how geo-social networks can provide
spatio-temporal information linking physical and virtual
identities. Although this approach allows for large-scale
links between physical and cyber domains, the identity
attributes that can be inferred from cyber location data are
currently limited to online social networks and relatively
shallow identity descriptors. For instance, the project has
developed a method to model and geographically visualize
Twitter activity. From this, the user is able to infer names,
ethnicity, gender of Twitter users, and temporal activity
patterns across different physical locations (e.g., London,
Paris, and New York) [14].
Much of the previous attribution work has centered on
author attribution and cyber intrusion attribution, e.g.,
[15-17]. This work is heavily weighted toward automated,
machine-learning solutions. Moreover, the attribution
efforts do not cross identification domains.
For many applications, a holistic approach to under-
standing identity is needed. A holistic approach would
span and link physical and cyber domains and be organized
in such a way that individuals working with identification
tools could intuitively understand, organize, manipulate,
and infer unknown from known pieces of information
about an individual or group. This paper introduces the
SuperIdentity approach to these issues and describes the
user-centric methods used in the development of the
SuperIdentity model and visualization interface.Developing the use cases
Use case development was an early activity in the Super-
Identity project. It is important to note that the majority
of these use cases were obtained in the United States
and hence some of the constraints discussed here are
based on the legal framework applicable in the United
States. However, researchers in the SuperIdentity project
are looking at differences in laws in different countries,
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of differing legal, cultural, and ethical frameworks [4].
Use cases were collected for several reasons. First, use
cases provided insight into how analysts who have the
task of identifying individuals currently work, including
information they usually know, information they need to
know, the certainty needed in identifications, resources
used, and obstacles encountered, such as time constraints
and inability to access certain resources. Secondly, under-
standing current work provided insights about what
identity attributes would be useful and how to present
this information to the end-users.
Individuals were recruited from three analysis domains:
intelligence analysis, cyber security investigations, and law
enforcement. PNNL works with a number of different
agencies and law enforcement departments, so individuals
in some of these organizations were contacted to help
recruit participants. In the United Kingdom, recruitment
was facilitated by one of the project sponsors. In the law
enforcement domain, we interviewed individuals from
the county sheriff ’s office, a police chief, and city law
enforcement officers working in a fusion center. The
individuals who participated were interviewed about
their work in identifying individuals.
Questionnaires were also developed to elucidate the
types of information that were used and how important
the various information types were to the identification
work. After the semi-structured interviews, participants
were asked to look at information in different domains
and identify those elements they commonly used in their
work. For example:
Demographics/physical attributes: age, gender,
ethnicity, handedness, facial biometrics
Work and extra-curricular activities: hobbies/interests,
travel plans, group affiliations
Financial information: owned assets, banking information
Court/council records: arrests, tickets/fines, current/
past addresses
Cyber attributes: email addresses, social network user
names, personal websites
Overall, 21 individual use cases were developed. Com-
monalties were identified in these individual use cases,
which resulted in the generation of several generic use
cases, such as going from an online user name to an
actual name. In addition, a number of exemplar use
cases were generated, illustrating how different types of
information can be combined to augment what we know
about a person, including cyber (e.g., IP address), bio-
metric (e.g., fingerprint), biographic (e.g., home address),
and psychological (e.g., personality traits) information.
In this paper, the focus is on the issues involved in law
enforcement. Besides gathering information to generateuse cases, additional information about policies and pro-
cedures in law enforcement was obtained, providing
valuable insights into the context in which software tools
need to work. The following paragraphs contain infor-
mation about the context in which identification tasks
often take place. It should be noted that the majority of
this information is based on interviews done in the US
states of Oregon and Washington.
Much of the public-facing law enforcement work is
done in real time and in close proximity to the individual
being identified—e.g., during traffic stops. However, for
some officers there is also other investigative work that,
while it does not have to be completed in real time, has a
requirement for the task to be completed as efficiently as
possible.
Real-time law enforcement work, such as traffic stops,
can have many constraints. While a law enforcement
officer may stop a car or an individual, there has to be a
valid reason, such as a traffic violation. The driver of the
car or the individual stopped does have to talk to the
law enforcement officer, but the discussion must focus
only on the reason the individual was stopped. The indi-
vidual detained can refuse to answer questions, but it is
illegal to lie to a law enforcement officer. The individual
stopped can only be detained for a short period of time;
a traffic stop that lasts for more than 20 minutes is
unreasonable. If passengers are in the car, they cannot
be asked for identification or questioned unless the officer
has seen them break a law.
Having stopped an individual, the law enforcement
officer has information about the vehicle (if driving),
the driver’s license of the individual driving the vehicle,
and a physical description of the individual. This infor-
mation can be communicated via radio or a computer
and additional information obtained, such as the owner
of the vehicle, the name and aliases of the driver, whether
there are outstanding warrants for the arrest of the driver,
and possibly information as to whether the driver has a
history of being “unfriendly to law enforcement.” If there
is a warrant out for arrest of an individual with this name,
date of birth, and matching physical characteristics, the
officer is justified in taking the individual to the police
station and taking fingerprints to increase the certainty
of the identification. It is currently not legal to obtain a
DNA sample.
In general, law enforcement officers preferred to err
on the side of caution. It is better to take a person in for
more questioning than to miss picking up a person who
has outstanding warrants. When officers provide data on
the stopped individual to a police database “near misses”
are returned if there is no direct match. Sorting out a
number of near misses may consume too much time,
so the officer may take the individual back to the police
station for full identification.
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their investigation but also lack the richness of information
(physical and recorded) that officers in real-time situations
have. There may be physical descriptions from eyewitnesses
and a description of a vehicle and/or a license plate num-
ber. Items may be left behind, including notes, fingerprints,
and footprints. The goals are to locate the individual(s) who
were involved in the crime being investigated and to place
them at the scene of the crime with enough certainty to
make an arrest.
In addition to the work done by Law Enforcement
Divisions, the United States has created a number of
fusion centers in response to the September 11, 2001
terrorist attacks. These fusion centers, located in urban
areas, comprise representatives from the major intelligence
agencies and state and local law enforcement agencies.
They can share information to help with law enforcement,
prevent terrorist activities, and respond to emergency situa-
tions [18]. The analysts that work in these fusion centers
are a very rich resource for our use cases as they deal with
many different types of data, from different sources, with
differing confidence levels; hence, several interviews were
conducted with analysts from fusion centers.
In the 21 use cases we collected, 10 were from the law
enforcement domain and the rest were from intelligence
domain. Here we focus on the law enforcement use
cases. Of these 10, three could be classified as strictly
attribution tasks: a crime has happened and the task is
to identify who did it. Four could be classified as enrich-
ment tasks: an individual is known but it is unknown if
this individual is a danger to police. Three others could
be classified as both attribution and enrichment: is this
person really who they say they are, and what else is
known about that person? Even attribution tasks are
often more complex that just going from a crime to a
name. We might have several similar crimes and want to
determine if the same individual is responsible for all
crimes. Of the use cases involving enrichment, two were
descriptions of real-time incidents; law enforcement
officers have an individual in front of them and want to
understand who that person is and if that person poses
a danger to them.
A typical use case is the Property Crime: Someone has
broken into a car and stolen some items. There is a small
amount of evidence, e.g., some fingerprints, a footprint,
and perhaps a description of the person from a passerby.
The police want to find out who is responsible. They need
to find the name of the individual and the individual’s
current location.
The use cases, such as the examples discussed above,
provided a good understanding of the tasks, resources
and constraints that law enforcement officers face. Using
this information a number of exemplar use cases were
developed. Similar themes in use cases were identifiedand merged into an exemplar use case. As the individual
use cases are based on what is currently done, the
exemplar case studies were augmented to utilize the
work in SuperIdentity. These use cases are being used
in developing the visualizations to demonstrate to end
users the different possibilities for obtaining the desired
information given their starting information, the various
resources available to them, and the certainty required
in their identification. The visualization work will be
discussed in the SuperIdentity model and visualization
Section and will use the exemplar use case below.
The exemplar use case described below is based on a
real homicide case. We have added a second homicide
to illustrate how the model can be used to in connecting
information between two crimes. We have also added an
iPhone to introduce new types of information used by
the model.
Two homicides occurred in a particular town within two
weeks. The police are trying to find a possible suspect or
suspects and motives. They have several pieces of informa-
tion. At the scene of the first homicide, a witness saw a car
leave the area and is able to recall a partial license plate. An
iPhone was dropped at the second scene and police believe
it is reasonable to assume that the phone is not associated
with the victim or the victim’s friends or family.
Using the description of the car and the partial license
plate number, the police have located a set of a dozen
suspects. Of these, only four were anywhere close to the
area of the crime scenes. None of these four have any
police records. However, the phone number of one of
these persons was listed as a recent call on the cell
phone left at the scene.
The license plate information and car description are
typically what would be expected for information as are
the contents of the cell phone, such as recent online
activity and fingerprints on the phone. In the next section,
the model will suggest other information that may be
obtained. If a suspect can be identified and brought in
for questioning, it may be possible to determine if the
suspect was responsible for both homicides.
SuperIdentity model and visualization
The exemplar use case described in the previous section
demonstrates the requirement to consider identity as
complex phenomena crossing many different domains.
SuperIdentity considers identity across four comple-
mentary domains: an individual’s biological makeup,
biographical information, online presence (cyber domain),
and mental makeup (psychological domain). These cross-
domain characteristics are used to evaluate the holistic
identity associated with individuals.
There are projections of identity in the natural world;
the physical projections of identity include things like
biometrics, an individual’s description (height, sex, weight,
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to help recognize individuals in the natural world. In
addition to these physical projections of identity, bio-
graphical information provides factual information about
the individual, such as home address, occupation, social
security numbers, work address, etc. This information is
often used to locate or identify a single individual.
Over the last 20 years, online projections of identity
have emerged; these projections in cyber-space are now
pervasive throughout society. Society uses cyber-space
for everything from very personal activities (such as
engaging with friends, documenting our lives, expressing
our creativity), to learning and developing opinions, to
very practical concepts such as travel planning, com-
merce, and banking [19]. All online activities leave a trail
of identity pieces scattered throughout cyber-space,
whether through conscious disclosures (e.g., on social
networks), subconscious disclosures (such as exploited
in textual-content analysis), or through technology-level
leakages (e.g., through cookies) [20]. Meta-data associated
with online activities also exists, such as IP addresses,
account names, etc., which can all be related to an indi-
vidual’s identity.
The final identification domain that is important to
consider when discussing identity is the psychological
domain. This involves the psychological profile of an
individual. Measures like the Big-5 [21] and the Dark
Triad [22] give insight into concepts such as extraversion,
conscientiousness, Machiavellianism, etc. These personal-
ity elements often drive behaviors in different spaces and
as such are important to understand when investigating
an individual.
All four of these identification domains are important
to consider. This is clear from the exemplar use case in
the Developing the use cases Section. Starting with a mo-
bile phone, much of the data available is likely to be related
to the cyber domain, and much of the investigation may
involve gathering online data. But the investigator likely
wants to explore more about the motive of the individual
and indicators of intent. Both psychological traits and con-
tent posted on the Internet will be contributing factors.
The license plate will provide contradictory information to
that of the phone: the owners are not the same person.
This investigation will draw in social contacts, physical resi-
dence, and temporal location. Leveraging all this data to
yield a more complete picture of the individuals involved
requires the collective use of data from all four domains.
To this end, we use an intuitive modeling approach
that, in an investigative mode, allows the capture of
these rich identities in addition to documenting both the
processes by which the pieces of identity were derived and
the confidence associated with each piece. To illustrate,
consider the partial license plate gathered as evidence
from the exemplar use case. Any identification performedwill have a moderate level of uncertainty attached to it
because the correctness of the license plate is in question.
Inferences suffer the same potential uncertainty, depend-
ing on the nature of the inference. An investigator might
infer a relationship between a phone’s owner and a person
listed in the contact list, but uncertainty exists about
the nature and strength of that relationship. Knowing
how the inferences were made (their derivation) and
their associated confidence is necessary to yield a complete
picture of what is known, and what is unknown, about a
particular identity.
The model is built around two simple concepts: ele-
ments of identity and inferences. An element of identity
is a single piece of information that is representative or
indicative of an identity; it does not need to be unique
(i.e., an individual’s height), it may be unique in a given
context (i.e., a Twitter user name is unique on Twitter, but
the same user name may be used by another individual
on Instagram) or it may be globally unique (e.g., a MAC
address). Each element has an associated confidence that
is related to the uncertainty associated with an element.
As part of the SuperIdentity project, a simple taxonomy
of these elements of identity has been created with the top
layer of the hierarchy representing the four identification
domains discussed previously (biological, biographical,
cyber, and psychological). The folksonomy was created
as a joint-design exercise amongst the SuperIdentity
consortium. The cross-disciplinary expertise within the
consortium was exploited in order to identify both the
elements of identity across all projections of identity and
then place the elements into a hierarchy. The hierarchy
that resulted from this exercise contained four distinct
levels the top-level representing the four domains (as
discussed previously), the level below this representing
a sub-division within this domain (for example within
Cyber there are subdivisions for devices (e.g. smartphone,
laptop, etc.), generic technologies (e.g. e–mail) and perso-
nas (an individual’s use of a site)). The penultimate level of
the hierarchy represents the space where the element of
identity is exposed (for example elements are exposed
in a Facebook account, other elements are exposed in a
hand). The final element of the hierarchy is the actual
data point – this represents the element that is explicitly
measured or captured (for example within Facebook, the
username, the avatar, the friendslist etc. all represent
elements that can be captured, for a hand the fingerprints
can be captured, the fingerlength can be measured, etc.)
Figure 1 illustrates Facebook and hand identity elements
as examples within the context of the SuperIdentity hier-
archy. Summarizing statistics related to the model as a
whole can be found in Table 1.
This hierarchy allows control of the fidelity around the
elements of identity, e.g., an investigator may be inter-
ested in anything about the individual’s work-life rather
Figure 1 Hierarchical view of the SuperIdentity model. The penultimate level of facebookpersona and hand are revealed. White nodes
represent fully expanded portions of the hierarchy and blue nodes represent collapsed portions of the hierarchy.
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completely agnostic of any particular taxonomy—mean-
ing any taxonomy of elements can be used, and it is
expected that individual organizations will tailor the
taxonomy of elements to their context.
Simply having a bag of elements of identity is not
enough to satisfy the exemplar use case previously out-
lined. To this end, we introduce the second core concept
of the model: inferences. These allow the creation of a
new, previously unknown element of identity from a
known element of identity; these can be simple, auto-
mated transforms (e.g., using a Twitter username to infer
the corresponding Twitter avatar), more complex infer-
ences that use statistical correlations (e.g., the estimation of
height from foot-length), or other inferences that involve
using databases of information the investigator may have
available (e.g., the ability to infer a name from a home
address using a local authority database). Each inferencehas an associated description, which explains how to
perform the inference; in essence, what process does an
investigator need to perform the inference?
Confidence can be propagated along an inference. In
other words, given an input element, it is possible to
calculate the probable confidence of the result of the
inference. The discussion of this is beyond the scope of
this paper, but the reader is referred to [24,25].
The model results in a directed graph with the vertices
representing elements of identity and the edges repre-
senting inferences. The inferences are annotated; these
annotations are dimensions that are used to describe a
number of the inferences’ characteristics, for example,
whether a transform can be automatable, how long it
takes to perform the inference, whether the inference
uses classified technology, etc.
The model provides a guide as to how to perform the
identity attribution or enrichment tasks; while the model
Table 1 General statistics from the super identity model
Number of elements 297
Elements in the Biographical Domain 56
Elements in the Biological Domain 50
Elements in the Cyber Domain 157
Elements in the Psychological Domain 34
Number of transforms 1853
Source Element in the Biographical Domain 275
Source Element in the Biological Domain 74
Source Element in the Cyber Domain 1413
Source Element in the Psychological Domain 91
Average size of SuperIdentity*
At 70% Confidence 5.81
At 50% Confidence 14.45
At 20% Confidence 24.27
*The number of elements that can be populated beginning from each
element and following transforms until the confidence is lower than the
given confidence.
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the model will not, at present, perform an inference. The
model can be thought of as a recipe book that allows users
to explore identity in a number of different ways.
Casting an identification activity into the model results
in a set of known elements (representing an investigator’s
starting knowledge, e.g., the evidence from an investigator)
and a set of desired elements (representing the final know-
ledge required). Given this bound, the model queries the
graph to work out all routes through the graph from the
known elements to the unknown elements. Individual
paths can then be chosen based on the paths that provide
the desired elements with the greatest confidence or by
using the vertex labels (e.g., the route that provides the
fastest answer, routes that don’t require the use of the
internet, etc.).
Once a set of possible routes has been chosen, it is
then possible to use the routes and the descriptions
associated with each inference to lead an investigator
through the steps required to perform the tasks. This
output from the model then provides the guide that the
investigator can use.
The model has a number of other uses in both privacy
and capability management [23,25], including the ability
to allow investigators’ gut instinct to jump around the
graph, effectively creating their own ad-hoc inferences
[24,26].
The SuperIdentity visualization complements the Super-
Identity model by helping the user explore and traverse
the model, encapsulating the computations performed over
the model, and organizing gathered data for review and
dissemination. The visualization is a workflow managementapplication and is designed to lead the user through a
step-by-step process with the model supporting the
underlying computation. In this way, using the application
is much like route planning. In fact, the visualizations used
draw inspiration from transit maps (e.g., the London Tube
Map) [27]. The user has a starting point, a desired destin-
ation, and potentially many intermediate points. By using
such a metaphor, we hope to help the user anticipate the
flow of the application.
The application comprises a series of screens that rep-
resent stages of an investigative process: establishing a
context for the inquiry, recording known quantities and
desired quantities, exploring routes from that which is
known to that which is desired, navigating those routes
to arrive at a result, and reviewing the results of the
inquiry. Each of these is depicted in order from top to
bottom in Figure 2. The application leads users through
these screens with animated transitions (panning from
left to right) as the investigation progresses from one
stage to the next. More detailed images of each stage are
provided below as the stages are discussed.
The context for an inquiry is termed a project in the
application. A project has no associated data to begin
with but accumulates data as the user begins to record
his or her findings. Any data discovered, either as a desired
result or an intermediate result, is recorded in the context
of the project and recalled whenever the project is opened.
Computations performed by the model are stored and
recalled as well, but they have no effect on any other
project.
Primarily, data is collected as discrete entities called
nodes. Nodes that are constructed from values known a
priori are called seeds. They represent the knowledge
with which the user begins. Nodes constructed without
a known value but that represent what the user would
like to know are called targets. The user’s interaction
with the application will be a progression from seeds to
targets. The first screen, then, represents the dichotomy
of seeds and targets (Figure 3). This dichotomy is rein-
forced visually by the vertical divide in the central circle
of the second screen; the circle represents the whole of
the identity, with seeds on the left and targets on the
right. An investigative process is a movement, using
information transformations from left (the seeds) to right
(the targets).
The application aids the user in recording seeds and
targets by listing the representative elements from the
model. Once a suitable element is chosen, if the node is
a seed, the user is given the opportunity to record the
known value and an approximate confidence in the
accuracy of the data. Users’ confidence may vary with their
confidence in the source. No further data is recorded for
targets because none is known; the application is designed
to aid in its discovery.
Figure 2 All four screens of the SuperIdentity application. From top
to bottom: Project Create/Open, Seeds & Targets, Path Overview, and
Path Walkthrough. The user progresses from left to right within the
application, returning to the Overview after completing a walkthrough.
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value. The visualization maps these percentages into
ranged categories of confidence: Very Low, Low, Medium,
High, Very High, and Certain. The ranges and the termin-
ology are configurable. Kesselman [28] shows that users
make poor use of numeric ratings, so we have adjusted
our visualization accordingly. To record their confidence,
users select a category from a dial. The selected confidence
is highlighted. The same terminology and representation
of confidence are repeated throughout the interface.
Once the endpoints are established, the application
can suggest paths through the model (traversals of the
graph) that will lead the user from a seed to a target.
Every path is composed of two or more nodes; a seed
and a target are required. Nodes may be of any identifi-
cation domain, as long as a transform exists between the
source and the immediate target. If a direct transform
exists (from the seed directly to the final target), then
the path will be two nodes long. Otherwise, the model
will employ intermediate nodes to complete the path.
Every transform from one node to another incurs
some measure of error and thus some loss in confidence
in the result. By their nature, longer paths tend to yield
a lower confidence result. Paths are generated for all
seeds and targets provided as inputs and a default final
confidence is computed based on the encoded loss in
confidence incurred by each transform. Paths are then
sorted by their final confidence and presented in descend-
ing order. The paths that are likely to result in the highest
confidence result are presented first.
There are times when no paths will be available from
the provided seeds to the provided targets or when the
paths provided are low confidence, undesirable, or non-
existent. In such cases, the model is able to suggest
other seeds that may yield a higher confidence result.
The user can engage those seeds by adding them on the
previous screen and seeking out the necessary data, ifFigure 3 Seeds and targets entry screen (Also called Knowns and
Unknowns). Examples of seeds and targets enumerated to populate
the visualization. Seeds can have associated data and confidences;
Targets have none and will be discovered through interaction.
Figure 4 Paths as presented in the overview. A user can see the
expanded view (right side) by clicking on a collapsed path (left side).
“Select” progresses the user to the Walkthrough.
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cluding the added seeds, returning the higher confidence
paths. Alternate seed suggestions will prefer seeds that
share the closest possible relationship to existing seeds
(e.g., a Facebook username seed, John Doe, might gener-
ate a suggestion for a Twitter username seed, @johndoe).
If close relationships are unfruitful, the suggestions will
reach out as far as a related sub-domain but no farther.
For example, the Facebook username might generate a
suggestion of website address but not physical address,
because physical address is considered to be of a differ-
ent identification domain.
The color of the nodes encodes the domain of origin
(i.e., cyber, biometric, biographic, and psychological),
which is reinforced with a symbolic representation when
the user selects a path. A selected path presents the
name of each node, its identification domain, and the
order in the path. After inspecting the details, the user
can progress to a detailed walkthrough of the path or
select an alternate path. A selected path, with other
paths juxtaposed, is depicted in Figure 4. The path is
read from the top down, starting with the expected final
confidence, followed by a seed, intermediate elements,
and concluding at a target. “Select” takes the user to the
Path Walkthrough screen for that path.
Once a path is chosen, the user walks through the
path, following one transform after another, acquiring
data for each node until arriving at the target node. The
user interface aids in this process by presenting each
node in a linear progression mimicking the Path Over-
view screen described earlier but providing more detail
and isolating the selected path. In this view, a dialog is
presented at each step that allows the user to record
findings and rate confidence in the result (Figure 5).
Users are not required to enter data or record a confi-
dence to progress. The data field is left blank; a blank
data field only prevents automatable transforms from
performing their task and later information retrieval (e.g.,
for reporting). In every other respect, the model can still
function. The default confidence set is that provided by
the model based on the confidence of the previous node
in the path and the confidence loss due to the transform.
If the user elects not to specify a confidence, this default
confidence is used.
To aid the user in performing non-automated transforms,
the model supplies a descriptor of means for performing
the transform. As an example, to transform from the length
of a person’s hand to their gender, the model supplies
“Handlength and Gender are correlated—men tend to have
longer hands,” which provides a basis for inference. Some
transforms are more complicated than others, but all
transforms are intended to be a single step. This is where
the linear nature of the walkthrough is most clearly
beneficial: it dramatically simplifies the reasoning processfor the user, allowing them to focus on the transform tasks
(which a machine cannot perform).
It may be prudent here to discuss transforms that
require multiple input elements but yield a single output
element. For example, biometrics on multiple attributes
of a person’s voice can yield inferences about certain
personality traits [29]. In such cases, the path is a com-
posite path and begins at bifurcated sub-paths that join
at a later node. The linear progression is preserved by
leading the user down one sub-path, then the other,
and finally completing the transform at the merge node
before progressing to the target node.
At the end of the walkthrough, the user is presented
with a summary of the result: the user-populated target
node and its confidence, other target nodes that have
been populated in previous walkthroughs, and the op-
portunity to return to the Path Overview to pursue a
new target. (The Path Overview is updated to give
preference to unpopulated target nodes.) A path can be
visited more than once, and a target node can be popu-
lated multiple times with potentially conflicting results.
Table 2 Conceptual paths that demonstrate prototypical
model output
Path Confidence
Phone contents→ Geo-tagged photos→ Home address Medium
Phone number→ Cellular account → Person name Certain
License plate→ Car registration → Person name Certain
Phone contents→ Social media account names→
Content of recent posts*→ Indicators of mental health
Low
Phone contents→ Social media account names→
Content of recent posts*→ Indicators of motive or intent
Low
Phone→ Swipe gesture arc→ Handedness High
Phone contents→ Contact List → Association with victim Medium
*This assumes the information is either publicly available or legally accessible.
Figure 5 One transform in the Walkthrough, from “(#2) Twitter avatar” to “(#3) Twitter images of.” The value and confidence are recorded in
the dialog. The means of performing the transform are described above the dialog. After the final transform in a path, the dialog displays a summary
of the acquired targets and their confidences.
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further paths to high confidence data for the target node.
Application to use cases and future work
The construction of the model and the design of the
interface are intended to support the identity attribution
use cases identified through interaction with the targeted
communities. To illustrate, we now consider the role of the
visualization in support of the “Connected Homicides?”
use case.
The connected homicides use case does not have a
strong temporal element as other law enforcement cases
typically have. There is sufficient information that can
be considered known items including the partial license
plate, description of the car, and geolocation, as well as
data that can be retrieved from the phone recovered:
swipe gesture, fingerprints, contacts, user names, and
other content. The unknown items of identity revolve
around identifying information to discover any correlations
between the perpetrators. In particular, the user wants to
know if the perpetrator in each case is really the same
person.
These known items form the start points in the model;
the model is queried to provide the possible paths from the
start points to required information. The output of the
model is the set of paths that can be followed in order to
solve the problem, as described in the SuperIdentity model
and visualization Section. The current instantiation of
the model emphasizes cross-domain transforms—that is,
making connections from one identity domain to another.
For example, the model suggests connections from the con-
tents of the phone to a probable home address. To ac-
complish this, the model presents a path leading from
the phone to photos taken by the user that are geo-
tagged to a location or area that has a strong grouping.
Other examples of paths provided by the model, withthe given seeds and targets, are in Table 2. This set of
paths provides not only simple paths that an investiga-
tor is used to using but also unconventional paths that
an investigator may not be used to using. This is par-
ticularly useful should an investigation stall or an inves-
tigation not proceed as expected.
The phone and the car establish an interesting pair.
From the license plate, the user should be able to acquire
the vehicle registration, and then the name of the person
to whom the car is registered. The phone should also yield
a name, stemming from the account with the phone com-
pany. Given the scenario, these names will not match,
which will lead the investigator down an uncertain path:
Were both people involved? How? Who should be
brought in for questioning? What other evidence can be
gathered in support of one or another suspect?
The model yields further paths that can aid in this
process, and alternative paths can be suggested that use
alternate start points. This capability can aid stalled
investigations by suggesting other evidence that can be
gathered to unlock new paths. Alternatively, the model
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was involved in the homicides by taking multiple inde-
pendent paths and providing consensus over a particular
element of identity.
We have explored the use of this application to address
a use case provided by law enforcement. In the process,
both its strengths and weaknesses were revealed. In
revealing cross-domain opportunities to complete either
attributive or enriching identity tasks, the results were
good. These are investigative pathways not often used by
law enforcement. The application also benefits from its
simple, linear progression, reducing the complexity of the
statistical model to a form friendly to all users.
It is good to recall, however, that the application is
designed with more than just law enforcement in mind.
The collection of use cases came from analysts in
intelligence, cyber security, and law enforcement. While
there is some overlap in the use cases and similarity in
the identification needs of each community, there are
also significant differences. This application seeks to
benefit all attribution and enrichment tasks in a general
way. This generic approach can have negative impacts
on particular use cases. As an example, in the “Connected
Homicides?” exemplar use case considered, the car and
the phone produced two individuals of interest, but the
application provided no support for dividing the inves-
tigation or otherwise associating some pieces of identity
with one individual, and others with another.
The model and the visual representation are sufficiently
modular and general to be repurposed for applications
targeted at particular communities or even particular
investigative methodologies. Considering the use case
example presented here, one could envision customized
applications that contain legal aspects pertinent to a
particular law enforcement region or task. This approach
would facilitate the choice of paths based on what infor-
mation is acceptable as evidence. We did not investigate
those possibilities in this body of work and consider them
an exercise for future work. The following sections discuss
future work with the aim to consider further iterations of
the model in the modular or general sense, rather than a
strictly law enforcement focus.
Critical path
An overview of the collection of paths leading from all
seeds to all targets is essential to grasp the broader picture
of an investigation; it is termed the critical path. It high-
lights the nodes that are essential for a user to complete
his or her task and reveals transforms that suffer greater
losses in confidence. Some nodes have a greater number
of paths that pass through them. Some edges have a
higher possible confidence when transforming to the next
node in the path. Critical information for the user might
be intermediate nodes that are required for all paths to atarget or collections of transforms that are necessarily
weak, with no alternatives. For instance, Table 1 showing
conceptual paths for the “Connected Homicides?” use
case suggests that social media account names may be
an essential node for inferring information about phone
content, albeit with a low confidence. Such information
reveals both the strengths and weaknesses of the investiga-
tors’ position and can help them adjust to accommodate.
Automated transforms
Many transforms can be automated. Some transforms
are simple, like approximating height from hand length
or acquiring a social media avatar given a user name;
they’re simple functions that are easily performed by a
computer. More importantly, they are rudimentary tasks
for a user, and they should be relieved of such duties.
Some transforms are not simple but can still be auto-
mated—for example, performing facial recognition or
social network traversals. From our use case, automating
the transformation from the swipe gestures on a phone
to indicate handedness is automatable but would require
specialized software. Transforms of this category require
more sophisticated automation engines and likely more
sophisticated interfaces for the user to interact with. Some
transforms cannot be reasonably automated.
Every automated transform incurs some loss in confi-
dence, just as when a user performs the same transform,
they may be more or less confident in the result. A user-
name to an account avatar is a high-confidence transform,
while facial recognition software is beneficial but far from
perfect, yielding perhaps a moderate to low confidence
depending on the quality of the inputs. When users
engage an automated transform, they are also notified of
the resulting confidence, allowing them to compensate or
reconsider their investigative trajectory.
The present work has planned for the presence of auto-
mated transforms, but they have not yet been introduced
to the user interface and exposed as an executable option.
As more research from the UK institutions in the consor-
tium matures, we hope to introduce more opportunities
for users to engage automated processes to complete
portions of their work.
Review screen(s)
At present, the SuperIdentity application provides for a
shallow review of gathered data for the user: the seed-
target summary at the end of a path walkthrough. While
this is a beneficial reminder to the user of overall progress,
it is insufficient for important tasks like reconciling elem-
ent discrepancies and report generation. When the user
encounters multiple results for a single element, there will
need to be some means of exploring the evidence support-
ing or refuting each. Little work has been done yet to de-
sign an approach, and it is unclear what level of detail is
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in further interactions with the various user bases.
Reporting is supported in the sense that the model
retains all the nodes and their relationships to each
other. It also preserves node provenance, including
metadata (e.g., whether the node was populated by the
user or an automated transform). So the means are there
to recall any and all data users require to generate reports
of their findings, but no user interface requirements have
been compiled or considered as yet. This is another topic
for follow-up interactions with users.
Evaluation
Both the described exemplar use cases as well as others
developed will be used in evaluating the utility and
usability of this research. For each of the three analysis
domains (intelligence, law enforcement, and cyber security)
five to seven experts will be recruited for each evaluation
study. In the studies, the experts will be asked how they
would currently do the task, the resources they would use,
the certainty they would have in the result assuming
the necessary information needed could be obtained.
Using the SuperIdentity model and visualizations, a set of
experts will explore and evaluate the model’s capabilities
through solving the exemplar use cases. During the exer-
cise, the experts will be asked to talk out loud, providing a
more immediate evaluation of the model as they move
through the exemplar use cases. They will be asked which
paths they will take and the rationale for their decision,
including their views on the confidence levels associated
with pathways in the model. After the walkthrough,
participants will be asked to rate both the utility of the
model and the usability of the various visualization
components. This information will be used by the visual-
ization and model teams to make appropriate changes. It
is also important to get reactions as to which information
the experts feel comfortable using now, what information
they deem to be problematic, and how they may be able
to use their valuable tacit knowledge while using the
model.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we have presented a collaborative effort
from PNNL and Oxford, as well as other UK institutions,
that seeks to provide a capability to investigators for
enriching identities and attributing actions to individuals.
Oxford has developed a robust model for traversal of
paths between interconnected identity elements, statistical
computation of approximate levels of confidence in data,
and maintenance of investigative provenance. PNNL has
developed a visual analytic interface to make the model
accessible, so that investigators can leverage its capabilities
without fully comprehending the complex nature of the
model.These pieces were designed and built from requirements
gathered through interviews with analysts from multiple
domains. We explored those for law enforcement, high-
lighting one particular use case that could demonstrate
the capabilities of the model. It not only revealed par-
ticularly how the model can cross identity domains but
also revealed opportunities for specialization of the tool
in future iterations. We also discussed plans for improve-
ment and evaluation going forward.
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